For 21 years, ending in 1997, Washington observed an arms export policy variously described by US contractors as an "embargo" and by government diplomats as a "policy of restraint". Although several major defence deals were approved during this period – such as the sale of 24 Lockheed Martin F-16A/B fighters in 1982 to a then-pro-US regime in Venezuela as a counter to Cuba's arming of Grenada – the clear intent of the policy was to discourage high-technology arms transfers to Latin American governments.
Its effectiveness was widely debated, with the fact that the USA remained a dominant presence in the market despite the ban and that the Latin American militaries were free to shop for hardware among the USA's industrial rivals.
The policy required requests for exemptions to be initiated by civilian government authorities and delivered to their counterparts in the US Department of State. Such terms prevented US industry from responding to direct requests for product information made by Latin American military authorities.
These procedures were initiated by the US Congress in 1975 against Augusto Pinochet's military dictatorship in Chile. The new Carter administration expanded the policy to all of South and Central America in 1976. However, support for this approach in Washington began to erode in the mid-1990s with several Latin American militaries eyeing major deals for new fighter aircraft.
Arms control supporters feared loosening the policy of restraint could fuel a dangerous escalation of military power in a region pocked with many cross-border rivalries. But the Clinton administration, believing an age of military dictatorships in the region had passed and new US arms sales could be the impetus for forging important links, decided to break from the policy in August 1997. The decision came a few weeks before industry responses were due for the Chilean fighter deal ultimately won by Lockheed.
Source: Flight International