Business aviation advocates want greater protection of personally identifiable information associated with private aircraft tail numbers, but blocking access to that data is not like flipping a switch.
Completely restricting such information is nearly impossible, with third parties able to gather data regardless of what appears in the Federal Aviation Administration’s public forums. Determined flight-trackers can also use contextual information, such as what is already known about an aircraft and its operator, in addition to more sophisticated methods of cracking anonymous aircraft codes.
“We see some operators take one flight and need a new code because somebody has breached their data through an algorithm,” says Heidi Williams, vice-president of air traffic and infrastructure for the National Business Aviation Association (NBAA).
Star Trek-style cloaking devices for operators who would prefer not to have their movements picked up by flight-tracking websites and shared on social media do not exist. But flight-tracking can be made significantly more difficult.
Currently, the Federal Aviation Administration offers two pathways for aircraft operators seeking greater privacy: the Limiting Aircraft Data Displayed (LADD) and Privacy ICAO Address (PIA) programmes.
LADD is the more simple and widely used of the two, with tens of thousands of aircraft owners and operators engaged with the programme, according to Williams. That pathway involves limiting flight data “at the source, which is FAA data”.
“You can preclude specifics about your flight from being shared with anyone,” she says. “Then, you can allow your data to go to specific vendors, like your flight-planning provider.”
Flight data can be partially limited on FAA feeds, but Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) data transmits from aircraft roughly once per second – making it increasingly challenging to block public access.
Aircraft operators who want more privacy can take a multi-pronged approach that involves participating in both LADD and PIA. The latter option allows operators to use an anonymous International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) aircraft code in their ADS-B transmissions. Those codes are usually associated with an aircraft’s tail number.
Operators are required to fill out an application requesting one of the FAA’s limited number of anonymous aircraft codes. But switching codes is not an easy or uniform process, with work requirements varying greatly across aircraft types and avionics systems.
“When you swap out that code on your aircraft, it can be a very difficult process that almost always requires some kind of maintenance action,” Williams says. “You have a maintenance technician that has to get involved and either flips switches under the hood or they have do some kind of software application or upgrade and sign off on that.”
INDUSTRY CALLS FOR FLIGHT PRIVACY ENHANCEMENTS
An appetite exists in the business aviation community to refine the LADD and PIA programmes for user-friendliness. NBAA sees encouraging signs from regulators.
A data privacy update in last year’s FAA reauthorisation bill directs the FAA to withhold, upon request of an owner or operator, registration numbers and other aircraft signatures from broad public display.
It also contains language calling for greater protection for personally identifiable information across the spectrum of FAA-managed data. To that end, the FAA is exploring an “access protocol” for its aircraft registry, according to Doug Carr, NBAA’s senior vice-president of safety, security, sustainability and international operations.
“Today, it’s pretty open,” he says. “The FAA is moving to protect some of that data contained within the aircraft registry, but we know that there are some components of the industry that really need full access because of work that they’re doing in support of transactions or insurance.”
Industry groups are asking for improvements that balance safety with necessary data-sharing. The Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association (AOPA) has advocated in recent months to restrict the use of ADS-B data outside of airspace safety and efficiency purposes.
In February, AOPA chief Darren Pleasance sent a letter to then-FAA administrator Chris Rocheleau asserting that such data is increasingly used to target operators with “enforcement actions, legal harassment and bills from third parties”.
Pleasance points specifically to “questionable FAA enforcement action against legal water landings” and lawsuits filed against pilots for “nuisance, trespass and causing emotional distress despite operating at high altitudes and in full compliance with FAA regulations”. He says third parties also use ADS-B data to attempt to collect airport fees from pilots.
He acknowledges the efforts underway to develop the LADD and PIA programmes and limit the use of ADS-B data for “non-safety cases”, but he maintains that there is “more to do in this area”.
The FAA has said that it is considering making the LADD programme the default option, not requiring a request from operators.
”What that telegraphs is that there’s the anticipation by the FAA that that’ll be the primary choice,” says Brian Foley, a business aviation analyst with Brian Foley Associates. ”I would think that would be where most people will migrate towards, having the [LADD] system already set.”
BUSINESS AVIATION PRIVACY CONCERNS
Using the PIA programme, low-profile private aircraft operators can effectively withhold private information for long periods without needing to repeatedly change ICAO codes. But operators contracted to fly celebrities and C-suite executives are changing codes much more regularly.
“The FAA has been very helpful as this programme has grown in importance to recognise that some operators… face a flight-by-flight compromise of their code, and need new codes quickly,” Carr says.
Modern avionics systems make it relatively easy to change out an ICAO code for an anonymous one, with the code likely accessible from the flightdeck.
“Techs can get in there, input the new code and then continue with all the required maintenance functions,” Carr says.
Changing codes on an older aircraft might require getting inside the nose or the avionics bay and “re-strapping the back of certain boxes to reflect new digits”.
Another limitation is that PIA applies only domestically – specifically, on routes that stay inside 12nm (22km) offshore of the US coastline. Recently, the FAA has allowed anonymity for flights a bit farther offshore on routes between Florida and New York.
But many private aircraft operators fly internationally, which requires “taking out that anonymous code – again, another maintenance action – and putting in their original ICAO code”, Williams says.
She calls the PIA programme “not fully cooked” and needing an international solution.
At the recent ICAO assembly in Chicago, there was “a decent amount of recognition of the safety and security concerns stemming from ADS-B-based flight tracking”, Carr says. Currently, global aviation regulators vary widely in their protections of flight data. But sweeping changes on how countries cooperate on flight-tracking and data privacy are unlikely to come soon.
“Let’s not kid ourselves that we will see a solution in a year or two,” Carr says. “What’s likely to come from this is directed work to ICAO’s technical bodies that will hopefully come back within three years… for the assembly in 2028 to adopt a standard or recommended practice.”
HIGH PROFILE, HIGH RISK
Whether using an anonymous code is a lasting solution largely depends on the intensity of flight-tracking efforts.
Most famously, programmer Jack Sweeney has used social media platforms to publish the movements of private jets flown by Russian oligarchs, as well as those transporting tech moguls Jeff Bezos and Elon Musk, and musical performer Taylor Swift.
Flight-tracking enthusiasts also share the movements of private jets in seemingly more-benign ways on hobbyist forums, while reporters and researchers use fight data to watch the movements of global elites.
In December 2022, Musk posted his safety concerns on Twitter, which later became X when he purchased the platform. Musk argued that flight-trackers had posted ”my exact real-time location, basically assassination coordinates, in (obvious) direct violation of Twitter terms of service”.
Swift’s attorneys, meanwhile, delivered a cease-and-desist letter to Sweeney in February 2024, arguing that he did not have a “legitimate interest” in sharing specifics of her frequent jet travel.
Sweeney has previously spoken in favour of sharing flight data on transparency grounds, asserting that the movements of powerful people are in the public’s interest. He has reportedly persisted in jet tracking, though his social media activity in recent months suggests a major slowdown in public activity. His account remains disabled on X.
For some time, Sweeney had focused on sharing delay-based flight tracking, which does not show real-time locations but rather traces where aircraft have flown recently.
From the business aviation community’s perspective, real risks are associated with sharing flight-tracking information in real time. For similar reasons, airlines do not publicly share the passenger manifests of commercial flights.
While current privacy options are imperfect, advocates find a helpful parallel in how difficult it is to gain personally identifiable information from automobile license plate numbers.
“You wouldn’t want your license plate being read by the guy following you ,” Foley says. “You wouldn’t want him to know where you work, where you live [and] where you’re going.”
